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Americans are not particularly well-served by their current medical
care arrangements. In comparison to all of our major trading partners
and competitors, we are less likely to be insured for the cost of care,
and the care that we receive is almost certain to be more costly. Al-
though American medicine has produced many "miracles," we are not
the undisputed leader in medical innovation, only in the costliness and
ubiquity of high-technology medicine" Most of us "covered" by some
form of health insurance still worry about its continuation should we or
a close family member become seriously ill. Some of us are "locked
into" employment we would gladly leave but for the potential cata-
strophic loss of existing insurance coverage.
While everyone decries our peculiar ability to combine insecurity
with high cost, substantial reform of American medicine at the national
level has been enormously difficult to achieve, and comprehensive re-
form has been impossible. This is not simply a description of the
Clinton Health Plan debacle of 1993-94. On multiple occasions since
the Second World War, comprehensive national reform has been at-
tempted (and between 1973-74, appeared imminent), but has fallen short
of the necessary political majorities. Each of these failures has its own
peculiar history, and in each there are many contributing causes of the
failure? One simple fact remains, however. Americans have been dis-
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1. Based on several indicia, one source has determined that the United States rogs behind
other industrialized countries in health care quality. See JEREMY HURST, TIm REFoRM OF
REALm CARE: A CoMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SEVEN OECO ColJNTRIES (1992).
2 See Theodore Marmor, The Polilics of Universal HealJh /nsurQ/lu: Lessons from Past
Administralions?, 27 PoL. So. & PoL. 194 (1994). See also geMrally PAUL STARR. TIm So-
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satisfied with the nation's medical arrangements, but our political sys-
tem has been unable to come up with a solution that satisfies enough
of the people to overwhelm the other barriers to reform.
It is precisely here that American federalism can play a crucial role
in making genuine medical reform viable, successful, and acceptable to
most citizens. Political judgments about particular reform proposals are
products of personal experience, political ideology, and local economic
and social conditions. These factors change substantially as one moves
about the United States. If change is to be workable and acceptable, it
must take account of the real differences between New York and Idaho,
Wisconsin and Louisiana.
For example, because of their long and widespread experience with
health maintenance organizations (HMOs), Californians may be happy
with some version of "managed competition"3 among large plans. Ver-
monters, by contrast, may fmd the idea of an HMO appalling, and the
notion of competition between large health insurance cooperatives
laughable given the small size and sparse population of their state.
Maryland may prefer an "all-payer" rate-setting system4 for cost con-
trol, in no small part because this approach has had relative success
over the last two decades in constraining the state's hospital costs. The
governor of Kentucky has worked out with the state legislature a com-
plex and comprehensive version of "play or pay" statewide insurances
that seems to suit Kentuckians, or at least a majority of their legisla-
tors.6 The big problem in Alabama may be coverage, in Connecticut it
ClAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE (1982) (history of medical care from colonin]
times to the present); ODIN W. ANDERSON, HEALTH SERVICES IN TIlE UNITED STATES: A
GROwm ENI'ERPRISE SINCE 1875 (1985) (general history of health services from 1875 to the
present); Eu GINZBERG, THE MEDICAL TRIANGLE: PHYSICIANS, POUTIClANS, AND TIlE PuBLIC
(1990) (analysis of social factors influencing the development of health care systems since
World War m.
3. "Managed competition" can be defmed as "combin[ing] market forces and government
regulation . " [to] both restrain prices and encourage high-quality care and responsiveness."
THEODORE R. MARMOR, WITII MARK GoLDBERG, American Health Care Reform: Separating
Sense From Nonsense, in UNDERSTANDING HEALTH CARE REFORM I, 12-13, 263 (1994).
4. An "all-payer" system can be defmed as "[a] system of reimbursement under which
government and private insurance plans ('all payers') pay the same amount for the same ser·
vice." [d. at 256.
5. "Play or pay" can be defmed as "[a] health insurance reform plan in which employers
either provide their workers with a basic health benefits package ('play') or pay into a govern-
ment insurance poo!." [d. at 12, 265.
6. Governor Jones signed the Kentucky Health Care Reform Act into law in April 1994,
after a lengthy debate in both houses of the Kentucky legislature. For a complete discussion of
the legislative compromises and fmal bill, see Julia F. Costich & Mike Helton, The Kentucky
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is cost escalation.7
And so it goes. There is unlikely to be any single system that ei-
ther is or appears "best" for the whole of these United States. Regions,
states, even localities, differ in their demographic characteristics, politi-
cal cultures, existing styles of medical practice, and appetites for medi-
cal services. What is both practical and desirable varies enough to make
federalist variation both normatively attractive and politically wise as an
alternative to national stalemate.
Why not, then, let states choose how to reform American medicine?
If it is uncertain how any new proposal would work out in practice,
why run a single experiment, whiGh might fail, on the whole country at
once? Is it not precisely the genius of American federalism to permit
not only experimentation to discover what works at one time, but con-
tinuous variation in policy prescriptions over time to accommodate
changing conditions and differing preferences?
Our answer to these questions is "yes", but we must recognize that
there are serious and plausible objections to leaving much of health
planning to the states. We cannot here, of course, consider either all
aspects of or objections to the federalist proposal, and the analysis of
the issues we do address will have to be brief. In the next section,
therefore, we will sketch our basic approach and then conclude by
considering some of the major concerns a federalist approach to reform
raises.
I. THE BASIC SCRaiE
How would a proposal for state-led health reform work? First,
Congress would enact enabling legislation offering fiscal support (at
least maintenance of current levels of federal medical financing) to all
states establishing health insurance plans that meet federally-established
standards of national health reform. Thus, for example, states wishing to
avail themselves of federal support would be required to enact health
reforms that meet the following standards:
Health Refonn Act, 22 N. Ky. L. REv. 381 (1995).
7. Alabama's Medicaid experience with the large number of AIaOO.mians living "'-ell below
the federal poverty level suggests that state-sponsored universal coverage is infeasible. See, e.g.
Robin E. Margolis, Stale Health Insurance Reforms: Models or Impedimenrs for Nalioool HeaIlh
Care Refonn?, 9 No. 10 HealthSpan 17 (1992). In Connecticut, rapid and continued h:alth care
cost increases make the estimated subsidies required to provide universal nccess to h:alth insur-
ance cost-prohibitive, particularly in light of the administration's avowed grot to eliminate the
state income tax. Barty Zitser, Be Flexible in Molding the Budgel, HARTfORD COURANT, Jan. 8,
1995, at Cl.
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• Universality. All citizens and resident aliens must be guaranteed
health insurance coverage. Insurance coverage may not be denied for
preexisting medical conditions. Community rating is mandated. Insurers
may not sever coverage.
• Comprehensiveness. Congress should specify a minimum benefits
package which leaves states the option of adding required coverage for
additional services.
• Portability. Each participating state would recognize the health in-
surance coverage of citizens from other participating states.
• Accountability. States must designate a public agency responsible
for overseeing their medical care system.
• Fiscal viability. States must establish a reasonable plan for cost
containment. States exceeding national targets for medical inflation will
themselves be fmancially responsible for excess expenditures.s
Congress, it should be noted, must also enact accompanying legis-
lation (such as reform of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA)9 provisions for self-insuring companies) that allow states suffi-
cient legal discretion to pursue health care reform realistically.10 In
addition, states should be allowed (with federal approval) to fold Medi-
care and Medicaid into their "reformed" health insurance systems. Al-
though including Medicare and Medicaid will complicate matters for
states, including these programs is necessary: 40% of current health
care expenditures involve government funds; in many states, the elderly
are the dominant consumers of medical care; and Medicaid funds com-
pose the bulk of nursing home revenues.
Federal funding would be available to states meeting the national
reform standards. Funding ideally would be in the form of a block
grant. The size of the total grant (and the per capita components)
should vary with a state's income, its demographic profile, and its
history of medical inflation. l1 Federal monies would constitute only a
portion of the fmancing base. States, accordingly, would choose how to
fmance their portion of the health budget.
While the national standards for reform would apply nationwide,
8. For an elaboration of these standards, see Theodore R. Mannor & Joseph While, Under-
standing the Choices in Health Care Reform, 19 J. HEALTII POL., POL'y & L. 499 (1994).
9. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994).
10. See generally JOHN J. DilULlO, JR. ET AL., IMPROVING GOVERNMENr PERFORMANCE
(1993).
1I. Although it is easier to say than do, governments should not lock in an inflaled base;
we have forty years of Canadian, Australian, and Gennan history to see how federalist fmancial
problems can be handled. See JOSEPH WHITE, COMPEIlNG SOLunONS (1995).
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states would retain autonomy in deciding how to make these standards
operational. States could implement a plan resembling the Clinton
administration's proposal of 1993-94. They could pursue managed com-
petition without mandatory alliances, or they could select a single-payer
or all-payer form of regulation, individual mandates, vouchers, subsi-
dies, or a combination of these approaches. As long as they satisfied
the basic national standards, states would be free to create the health
insurance system of their choice.12
II. PERsISTENT QUESTIONS: FEDERALIST ANSWERS
A. State Variation
Should states be permitted to vary who is entitled to health insur-
ance coverage? Put another way, what does universal coverage mean
operationally, and what, if any, variation is permissible?
The answer, in our view, is simple. Citizens and resident aliens are
the proper beneficiaries of guaranteed health insurance and no good
case exists for permitting variation in this national standard. Universal
coverage is a precondition for the economic security expected from
substantial medical reform. We cannot reach that goal without requiring
that our citizens and legal residents have health insurance.13
There are, of course, grounds for treating the health costs of illegal
aliens (and the burdens they impose on localities) as a serious, but
quite separate issue in spreading the financial burden of expensive med-
ical care. Adjusting to the realities of illegal entry into the United
States is certainly an important feature of national burden-sharing. But
it is not one that should be built into a basic health insurance entitle-
ment After all, the psychological security we hope to produce from
"universal coverage" is for those legitimately within our borders. Deal-
ing with the financial consequences of illegal residents is crucial for
states like Florida, Texas, California, and New York, but this is part of
12. Although there is both widespread American ignorance and widespread caricaturing of
Canada's health system, in fact there is great variation in how the ten Canadian provinces meet
the five conditions (accessibility, portability, public administration, comprehensiveness, and fItC-
dom to choose one's caregivers) of the Canada Health ACL See Theodore R. Mannar, Heallh
Care Reform in the United States: Patterns of FoCI and Fiction in the Use of Ihe Canadian
Experience, AM. REv. CAN. Snm. 47 (1993), reprinIed in ThEoOORE R. MARMOR, UNDER-
STANDING HEALm CARE REFoRM 179 (1994); Roben G. Evans, "We'll Ta.J:e Care of II for
You": Hea1Ih Care in the Canadian Community, 117 DAEDALUS ISS (1988).
13. See infra part ILB.
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fiscal federalism, not entitlement to health insurance.
B. "Universal" Coverage
Does this mean that states really have no choice but to mandate
coverage for 100% of their legal residents? Not at all. First, no nation's
"universal" scheme is, in practice, truly universal. The Swiss are 98%
covered in a radically decentralized federal system with no mandates, as
are the Dutch. Germany has more than 95% coverage in a "mandatory"
system that exempts 20-25% of the populace from the mandate.
To us, 95% coverage would seem a sensible target (or expectation).
Moreover, states should be allowed to achieve this target by any rea-
sonable set of carrots and sticks that they fmd acceptable and effective.
C. Health Insurance Uniformity
How uniform should health insurance benefits be across states?
Should one fret if Minnesota residents have a health insurance plan that
differs in its covered services from that of South Dakota? This is a
more complicated question than is usually recognized.
A plan for universal health insurance that varies from state to state,
but that includes federal conditions for fmancial contribution, raises
three quite separable issues. First, there is the problem of raids on the
Federal Treasury by states that create "luxury" health insurance pro-
grams. Second, there is the problem that, with different resources, states
exerting the same level of fiscal effort cannot create the same compre-
hensive coverage. Third, there is concern that some states will choose
to have "inadequate" health insurance coverage.
The first and second issues can be addressed as part of the federal
formula for cash transfers to the states. As in many of our existing
programs of "cooperative federalism," the national formula should take
into account the relevant "risk" factors (the population as well as the
fmancial resources available to states) in calibrating the federal
government's fiscal contribution. No calibration can be perfect. It is
clearly possible, however, to eliminate major disparities in state capacity
by sensible design of the federal fiscal share.14
Similarly, the federal fmancial contribution should be in the form of
14. This will exclude silly arrangements like 50% sharing or, alternatively, infinitely complex
formulas that no one can understand. For a discussion of the obvious concerns, see Marmor,
supra note 12.
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a block grantIS States cannot raid the Federal Treasury by choosing
luxurious health insurance benefits if the total amount of the federal
contribution for each year is fixed. Spending above that level would
have to come from funds generated through state policies and state
political processes, not raids on the national treasury.
The "problem" of "inadequate" state health plans is, in many re-
spects, not a problem at all. If we assume the federal government is
making contributions that substantially equalize state fiscal capacities,
then claiming that a state has chosen an inadequate package of health
insurance benefits is surely problematic: that claim states little more
than that the speaker disagrees with the state's political choices. There
is no agreed-upon "best" health insurance (or medical care) system that
a state could offer. Both medical needs and medical preferences vary
widely across the United States. The relevant question is why a national
plan should override a state's perceptions of its needs. Or, put in other
terms, why shouldn't a state's expression of its political preferences
through the details of its health insurance package have priority, once
the agreed upon national standards have been met?
Virtually none of the arguments that usually justify national unifor-
mity applies to medical care. Certain forms of basic immunization right-
ly may be required to prevent the spread of disease, but these public
health "externalities" are, and have been, a modest part of health re-
form. Preventive measures also may be instituted quite separately from
whatever health insurance package is provided in particular localities. In
fact, these public health concerns primarily are a state responsibility
under the current health care scheme.
There is little reason to expect a "race to the bottom" in the provi-
sion of health insurance. As long as health insurance is being made
universal, the politics of health care in states will not resemble the
politics of welfare or Medicaid. Universality can be reinforced by fed-
eral conditions that require state subsidy or supplementation for low-in-
come persons, measures that ensure everyone has access to insurance
that is equally affordable to them. From an economic point of view,
there is considerable evidence that comprehensive health insurance
boosts productivity and hence state economic growth.16 Furthermore,
15. Generally speaking. block grants are lump-sum disbursements to states and localities that
those entities may spend in broadly-defined categories. See GraJl1S Come Wilh F~ Strings.
CHARLEsToN DAll.Y MAn., Feb. 9. 1995. at 18F. The federol financial contribution nltefmtively
can be calculated, and provided to states. on a per capita basis.
16. Two authors have expounded the argument that disparities in AFDC bcnclits indlltC
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we should worry as much about the possibility that states will provide
"too much" health insurance as that they will provide too little.17
Any argument that it is simply unfair to have state-by-state varia-
tion in health insurance benefits seems confused. To put the matter
more charitably, this position seems to assume some baseline of ade-
quacy for health insurance coverage that is established apart from any
process of collective decision making about what adequacy means. It is,
in short, criticism of a state's political choice rather than criticism of a
state's health insurance program. That a particular state wants to spend
less on health insurance and more on other things expresses a political
judgment with which one may disagree. It is hard to see, however, how
it violates some transcendental right to a specific level of health insur-
ance coverage equal to other states whose system one happens to pre-
fer.
Alternatively, such an "unfairness" claim may be that strict equality
of health care (or health insurance) is an aspect of national citizenship.
This is indisputably a controversial claim. Equality, by itself, says noth-
ing about adequacy. Harmonization at the level of the state least inter-
ested in expending on health insurance would be egalitarian, but it
would not be morally compelling; nor would a national average, or the
richest insurance package imaginable.
Finally, there is little reason to believe that some variation in health
benefits from state to state will have a major impact on location deci-
sions either of individuals or of firms. There is an expansive collection
of literature attempting to document that one or another social program
has some major impact on migration or location. IS To date, however,
no single factor has been shown to have any significant explanatory
migration, which iben influences slale policies. PAUL PETERSON & MARK ROM, WELFARE MAo-
NETS: A NEW CASE FOR A NATIONAL STANDARD (1990). Most'recent research, however, fmds
ibat public aid plays a small role in ibe migration decisions of poor families. For ibe best
recent analysis, see JAMES WALKER, MiGRATION AMONG LoW-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS: HELPING
THE WITCH DocroRS REACH CONSENSUS (Institule for Research on Poverty Working Paper No.
1031-94, 1994).
17. Robert G. Evans and oibers have writ1en on ibe Canadian experience of providing too
much hea1ib care for ibe healib it buys. See, e.g., Robert G. Evans & GL. Stoddart, Producing
Health, Conserving Health Care, in ALDINE DE GRUYTER, WHY ARE SOME PEOPLE HEALTIIY
AND OTHERS NOT? 27 (1994).
18. Economists report ibat Slale-manda1ed hea1ib benefits and similar raules to universal cov-
erage are paid for by workers in ibe fonn of slightly reduced wages. Such programs iberefore
have little impact on net economic conditions and employment. See Lawrence Summers, Some
Simple Economics of Mandated Benefits, 79 AM. EcON. REv. 177 (1989). For a useful overview
of Slale-manda1ed hea1ib coverage and ibeir estima1ed empirical effects, see Jonaiban Grober, The
Incidence of Mandated Maternity Benefits, 84 AM. EcON. REv. 622 (1994).
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power. There is no reason to believe that health insurance will be any
different from state programs for highways, education or welfare bene-
fits. In short, a strong form of federalist system would leave wide dis-
cretion among the states to determine the benefits package for them-
selves.
D. State Participation
What if some states fail to participate? Again, this "problem" is not
a problem at all, either politically and practically. Such a decision
merely means that a state prefers to strike out alone, using its own
resources. This is a political decision that a federalist approach clearly
permits. These states, of course, would receive no block grants. In such
cases the federal government also should withdraw gradually its contri-
bution to the state's Medicaid program and phase in taxation of the
value of employer-supplied health insurance. In short, there is no per-
suasive argument for the imposition of national standards unless a
state's insurance arrangements are being supported by nationally col-
lected dollars. Conversely, states not participating in the national pro-
gram should not be supported with national revenues.
As a practical matter, it seems almost ludicrous to imagine that any
state would seek to avoid federal standards when the costs are this
high. Much smaller fiscal consequences have induced all states to par-
ticipate in Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), Medicaid,
the Federal-Aid Highway Program, and a host of other ventures in
"cooperative federalism." This fact suggests another theme, discussed
below, that incrementalism in withdrawal of support is likely to be
effective as a participation signal to states that are merely poor per-
formers, not self-conscious non-participants.
E. Portability
If states are the basic administrative units for universal health insur-
ance, what happens when we travel or change our residence? For trav-
elers, the obvious solution is a national requirement that states recog-
nize the terms of other state's health insurance programs. There are
many practical issues involved here, but they are second-order ones;
Canadian provinces have a half century of experience in doing precisely
this in medical care. When we change our residences the solution is
equally straightforward. We will change our insurer, as most of us do
now when we move to a new state.
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Finally, how confident should we be that states can get the job of
health care reform done if they try? How confident should we be that
they will try? What about the health care reform capacities of the
states, both administrative and political? Can we really trust the states
to adopt and implement reforms that universalize coverage, make it
portable for their populations, constrain costs, and maintain quality? We
might as readily ask those same questions about the national govern-
ment. We already know the answers with respect to the current system
of joint public and private provision of health care; the system fails all
sensible tests for an effective medical care system.
We need not rely entirely on "as compared to what" arguments,
however. For one thing, a "federalist" approach does not eschew na-
tional standards, as we have discussed. Of equal importance is the fact
that a number of states have been engaged actively in health care re-
form efforts of their own and many are having significant success
against very steep odds, as we shall see.
Hawaii is perhaps the best known example. That state has devel-
oped an extraordinary amalgam of play or pay, monopoly bargaining,
voucher-type gap fIlling, and single-payer regulatory control under
which the whole population is covered.19 Quality of care and consum-
er satisfaction are both high, and health costs for Hawaiians, as a pro-
portion of state income, are five percentage points lower than the costs
to the average continental U.S. resident. There are many historical and
geographical explanations for these happy circumstances in Hawaii,20
but none explain away the one true success story in providing Ameri-
cans with universal health insurance coverage at reasonable cost. More-
over, the cost containment that has been achieved is startling in a state
that has the second highest cost of living in the United States.
A trip back east also reveals some reasonable results in states such
as Maryland and New York. For the past decade or more, both of those
states have been engaged in fairly aggressive rate regulation and "sup-
19. Studies indicate that Hawaii provides some fonn of health insurance to between 95% and
98% of its adult population. See Michael G. Pfefferkorn, Comment, Federal Preemption of State
Mandated Health Insurance Programs Under ERISA-The Hawaii Prepaid Health Care Act In
Perspective, 8 ST. loUIS U. PuB. L. REv. 339, 363 (1989).
20. For a discussion of the legislative history of the Hawaii exemption from ERISA preemp-
tion, for example, see id.
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ply-side" controls on hospitals. Their efforts have paid off handsomely.
Maryland's all-payer regulation of hospital rates is the most developed
and most successful in the country, and New York's rate of growth in
hospital spending is now among the lowest Is New York well-known
for low costs and good government? For that matter, is Maryland? And
yet, these states, pressed hard by hospital co~t escalation, which increas-
ingly showed up in their Medicaid budgets, took actions that have
constrained costs without, as far as anyone can tell, impairing the quali-
ty of care provided their populations.
Many other states have initiatives at various stages of planning,
enactment, and implementation (Minnesota, Delaware, Vennont and
Florida, for example). Others (such as New Jersey) have tried to strike
out in new directions only to find that they are hemmed in by federal
Medicare and Medicaid regulations, and particularly by the ERISA
preemption21 of state actions affecting self-insuring employers. Indeed,
Hawaii's signal success in universalizing health care while constraining
costs is significantly attributable to its ability to obtain a waiver from
ERISA's preemption rule (a waiver that has not been made available to
any other state in the country).
ill. OBSTACLES TO FEDERALIST REFolU.i
We must acknowledge the difficulties that face a federalist proposal.
The most important difficulty is that federalist refonn requires national
action. Were the federal government not already heavily involved in
medical care provision, feder3llst solutions of the sort we envisage
might already have emerged.
The federal government, however, already is involved in providing
health care in significant ways. The huge tax advantages to employer-
based health insurance make virtually any other fonn of private insur-
ance economically irrational. The current programs of Medicare and
Medicaid have large constituencies that will not easily yield what they
have currently gained to the vagaries of state politics.
Perhaps most importantly, the employer community that won ex-
emption for itself from all state regulation under ERISA, and then
managed to combine it with no federal regulation in the bargain, will
fight state-led refonn with enonnous energy. Indeed, because collective
bargaining often has much to say about the shape of health care pack-
21. See supra Dote 9.
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ages, unions will side with employers both in protecting the ERISA
preemption and existing tax benefits for employer-based plans. In short,
interest group politics strongly favor the status quo.
Interest group opposition can be overcome in American politics, but
this sort of succ:ess normally involves a moral crusade that leads in the
direction of uniform rights for all citizens. The need for national uni-
formity, however, is exactly what federalist solutions deny. Federalist
national action simultaneously must demand an end to the present sys-
tem, while leaving open the possibility for significant variety in the
systems that will emerge to replace it. This is an ideological stance that
is unfamiliar to most Americans. It combines liberal demands for uni-
versalism and social security with conservative demands for cost con-
tainment and devolution of authority to state governments.
We are not sanguine that such a federalist solution can be sold in
the American political marketplace. We are persuaded only that it is a
sensible approach that would benefit all Americans.
